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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:

RAYMOND CHARLES MARQUEZ,

Case No. 20060710-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his convictions based on conditional guilty pleas to unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (West 2004), and possession of paraphernalia in a drugfree zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58~37a-5 & 58-37-8(4)
(West 2004). Jurisdiction exists pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue L Was a weapons frisk of defendant justified, where he was discovered inside
a home being legally searched for a wanted fugitive and the police reasonably suspected he
was the fugitive or the fugitive's accomplice?
A trial court's factual findings underlying its determination of reasonable suspicion
are reviewed for clear error; its application of law is reviewed for correctness. See State v.
Brake, 2004 UT 95, \ 15, 103 P.3d 699.

Issue II Was defendant's arrest justified when he admitted that drug paraphernalia
was in his pocket and the paraphernalia was then seized?
A trial court's ultimate determination of probable cause is reviewed for correctness.
See State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, 15,141 P.3d 602 (citing Brake, 2004 UT 95, \ 15).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Defendant bases his challenge on the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession and/or use of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of section 5837-8(2)(a) & (4), and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of sections 58-37a-5 & 58-37-8(4) (R. 1).
Defendant moved to suppress the drugs and drug paraphernalia found on his person
(R. 10-11). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 17-20,
21-24,27-28,68). See Addendum A (Memorandum Decision Denying Motion to Suppress).
On July 3, 2006, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to possession of
methamphetamine, reduced to a third degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia,
a class A misdemeanor (R. 44-51). On July 17, 2006, defendant was sentenced to zero-to-

2

five years imprisonment on the felony and a concurrent term of one year imprisonment on
the misdemeanor, with both sentences concurrent to a third sentence of imprisonment in
another case (R. 53). Defendant timely appealed (R. 57).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Raymond Gerrish was running—running from the police and Adult Probation and
Parole [AP & P]. He was wanted for two alleged crimes: absconding from AP & P5s
supervision and felony drug possession (R. 73). See Addendum B (First Search Warrant &
Affidavit). He needed to hide. He decided to go to Shawn Cloward5s place in Helper, Utah
(id.). Cloward lived in a single-wide two-bedroom mobile home [house], but also had a
camper-trailer [RV] on the property, which could provide a second place to hide (R. 73; R68:
7). Gerrish trusted others on the property to warn him if the wrong person approached. Cf.
Add. B. He figured the set-up was perfect—well, at least, until January 29, 2005.
That day, the wrong person saw him. An unidentified confidential informer saw
Gerrish several times on January 29th and each time Gerrish was attempting to conceal
himself in Cloward5 s house and RV (R. 73). The informant realized Gerrish was hiding from
the police (id.). The informant immediately contacted the Helper City police, who also
"received information that there are suspects acting as lookouts5' on the property (id.). See
Add. B (Affidavit).

J

The facts are recited in the "light most favorable to the trial court's findings" and
ultimate ruling. State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App. 96, \ 2 n.l, 89 P.3d 185 (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
3

The police immediately secured a search warrant for the house and RV (id.). Given
Gerrish's fugitive status, his new felony charge, his intentional concealment, and the reported
presence of lookouts/accomplices on the property, the police were concerned for their safety.
Judicial permission was given for them to enter the property at night "for the safety of the
officers" so that their movements would be less detectible (id.).2 See Add. B (Affidavit).
That night, around 9:20 p.m., approximately ten officers from Helper City, Carbon
County, and AP & P, approached Cloward's (R68: 4, 6, 12-13). The officers separated into
two groups: one surrounded the house and the other surrounded the RV (R68: 6).
Officers Anderson and Wood approached the house (R68: 6,23). Anderson knocked
on the front door, yelled "police" several times, and demanded entry (R68: 6). No one
responded (id.). With guns drawn, Officers Anderson, Wood, and three others entered the
home (R68: 6, 26).
They immediately encountered three males and one female (R68: 6-7, 10). Officer
Anderson recognized one of the males, Rick Cloward, who was seated on a couch in the
living room (R68: 6-7,15, 19). Anderson did not know the other two males or if either was
Gerrish (id.). Officer Wood did not know any of the males or whether any of the them were
Gerrish (R68: 27, 31).3 See also Add. A (Trial Court's Findings at R. 27).
2

The trial court found that the search warrant was valid. See Add. A. Defendant
does not challenge this ruling on appeal.
3

Raymond or Ramon Gerrish is 5' 9", weighs 151 pounds, has hazel eyes and
brown hair, and was born in 1982 (R. 73; R68: 6). See Add. B (Warrant & Affidavit).
Defendant, Raymond Marquez, is 5? 8", weighs 160 pounds, has brown eyes and brown
hair, and was born in 1967. See Fingerprint Sheet contained in Pleadings File, Case No.
20060710.
4

Wood immediately confronted one of the males, later identified as defendant, standing
near the kitchen sink (R68:23). In the initial seconds, Wood was not sure "what the situation
was inside the house" and suspected that if defendant was the fugitive or an accomplice, he
was likely armed with a knife or gun (R68: 27-28, 31). To protect himself and the other
officers, Wood ordered defendant to the floor, handcuffed him, and frisked him for weapons
(R68: 27-28, 31). In patting him down, Wood felt a hard bulge in defendant's right front
pocket (R68: 24, 28-29). Worried that the bulge might be a hypodermic needle that could
poke him, Wood asked defendant what was in his pocket (R68: 24, 27). Defendant
volunteered, "paraphernalia" (id.). Wood then reached into the pocket and removed a fiveto-six inch long hypodermic needle and a metal spoon of about the same length (R68:24-25).
The spoon contained methamphetamine residue (R68:25).
Still suspecting that defendant was Gerrish or one of his accomplices, Wood asked
him his name (R68: 27, 31-32).4 See also Add. A (Trial Court's Findings at R. 27).
Defendant responded, "Raymon Marquez," which was later confirmed to be true (R68: 29,
31).5 Wood arrested defendant for possession of drug paraphernalia (R68: 33).

4

The search warrant identified Gerrish as the fugitive and then referred to unnamed
other suspects, who were acting as lookouts (R. 73). See Add. B. Wood testified he did
know, at the time of the frisk who was who or "what the situation was in the house" (R68:
27, 31). The trial court found that at the time of the frisk, "it was not known whether
[defendant] was the subject of the first search warrant" (R. 27). See Add. A. In context,
the testimony and finding support that Wood did not know if defendant was Gerrish or
one of Gerrish5 s lookout/accomplices.
following defendant's arrest, Officer Anderson searched defendant's wallet,
which presumptively contained identification (R68: 29-31).
5

While Officer Wood dealt with defendant in the kitchen, Officer Anderson
simultaneously approached the third male, later identified as Gerrish, who was in the hallway
(R68: 6-8, 14-15, 18, 31). Officers Wood and Anderson were in two different rooms and
could not see what the other was doing (id.). Consequently, Wood did not know what
transpired between Anderson and Gerrish in the bedroom until after Wood frisked and
questioned defendant in the kitchen (id.). See also Add. A (Trial Court's Findings at R. 27).
When Anderson first observed Gerrish in the hallway, Gerrish and the female, later
identified as Sylvia Marquez, were walking backwards, "back peddling, basically," towards
the bedroom (R68: 6-7, 19). Sylvia was screaming and yelling (R68: 17, 19-20). As they
reached the bedroom, Anderson could see methamphetamine pipes in plain view on a table
next to the bed (R68: 7, 15, 18). He ordered the two to the ground, but only Gerrish
complied (R68: 19-20). Sylvia just continued to yell (id.). For the moment, Anderson
ignored her, turned to Gerrish, and asked him his name (R68: 19). Gerrish lied and said he
was "Michael Anderson" (R68: 15, 19). Anderson did not know Gerrish by sight, but
suspected this was a lie and again asked him who he was (id.). This time, Gerrish gave his
true name (id.). Anderson picked Gerrish up off the floor, arrested him on the outstanding
warrants, and handed him to another officer (R68: 19). Anderson's encounter with Gerrish
lasted only five or so seconds (id.).
Anderson stayed in the bedroom (R68: 19-21). Now that he was done with Gerrish,
he turned to Sylvia, who was "hysterical" and still screaming and refusing to lay on the
ground (id.). Anderson felt her behavior was a threat to himself and the safety of the other

6

officers and handcuffed her (id.). No more than 30-40 seconds had passed since the police
entereu ii- . . = . . » . "

•

In the same minute, other officers detained and handcuffed Cloward in the living room
where a marijuana bong was in plain view (R68: 6-7, 14 45, 20-21, 23, 31-32; R. 74).
In detaining the home's occupants, the officers observed drugs and drug paraphernalia
•; ;•!.* - view "all over tl v K »•«
. • '

*>*!••• exception of tl le kitcl i "i l (id.)

\ n officer left to

obtain a second search warrant to search the home for additional drugs and evidence of drug
sales (R68: 7. 1 5 " 1 ; T? ^
Clow.r ;^

See Addendum C (Second Search Warrant & Affidavit).

- - . ,\ v.- c .K-ui!iu\t [viiuin..; ihc arrival H ihe second search warrant (7<i>> 8-

9, 12). Gerrish and defendant were placed in police vehicles *m- :;-;mspo-

.- -

1,

19, 32-33). Five minutes had passed since the police entered the home (R68: 33).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defers 1 .•

: '

1

'• ' " •

'

- -

:..;

:<,

:^j

armed and dangerous and, therefore, the frisk for weapons violated the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant further argues that the evidence which flowed from the allegedly illegal frisk, that
^ ...Smi-sion

v possessed drug paraphernalia MK: me paraphernalia itself, must be

suppressed. If suppressed, defendant asserts there is no evidence to si

• - >i.

While the outcome of this case turns on the legality of the weapons frisk, the legality
: .; u : -k depends on the facts. Here, however, defendant has not properly marshaled the
facts si ipporting 1 he legality < : »f 1 he ft isk and tl ic dei lial of 11 lis mc rtion to suppress.
Consequently, defendant's arguments should be summarily rejected.

7

Alternatively, even if the merits are considered, reasonable suspicion supports the
frisk. The police faced a dangerous situation in arresting a wanted fugitive in a private home,
where the fugitive was reported to have accomplices. In the initial minute following their
entry into the home, the police reasonably suspected that defendant could be the fugitive or
his accomplice. Given this reasonable suspicion, it was also reasonable for them to suspect
that he was armed and dangerous and, consequently, to frisk him for weapons to ensure their
safety. Because the weapons frisk was lawful, defendant's admission that the bulge in his
pocket was drug paraphernalia supports his arrest. The ultimate seizure of the paraphernalia
occurred incident to that arrest. In sum, the trial court properly denied the motion to
suppress.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
REASONABLE SUSPICION SUPPORTED A WEAPONS FRISK OF
DEFENDANT WHERE THE POLICE LAWFULLY ENTERED A
PRIVATE RESIDENCE TO ARREST A WANTED FUGITIVE AND
SUSPECTED THAT DEFENDANT WAS THE FUGITIVE OR HIS
ACCOMPLICE
Defendant asserts that no reasonable suspicion supports the weapons frisk. See Brief
of Appellant [Br.Aplt. ] at 7-11. According to defendant, "[n] either the search warrant nor the
arrest warrant, including the underlying crime for which a warrant was issued, indicate that
Mr. Gerrish [the subject of the search warrant] was a violent individual or that there was an
inherent or specific risk of violence to the officers charged with executing the search
warrant." Br.Aplt. at 10. Additionally, defendant claims he was a "compliant visitor," who
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presented no threat to the officers once he was handcuffed. Br.Aplt. at 11. Consequently,
defendant ai gues the frisk was illegal,
Defendant's arguments ignore the facts ui linb ca -a :ir>.l Minimi

* !l

:

'l

Because defendant fails to properly marshal the record facts, his claim of illegality should
be summarily rejected. See United Park City Mines Co, v. Stichting Mayflower

Mountain

F< mt is, 2006 I J I ' 35, \ 2 7 1 • '\ 0 P 3d 1200 ( \ varnii ig of "gi ii n consequences" when an
appellant does not marshal). Alternatively, even if the merits are considered, the totality of
facts known to Officer Wood at the time of the frisk support a reasonable suspicion that
defendant w as ai n led and dangerous.
{1) Defendant

Fails to Properly Marshal the i:m n in Sappm't

>/' (In1 /^isk.

Whether a weapons frisk is lawful is "highly fact dependent." State v. Brake, 2004
I I ^ , 1| 2, MM P. MI 690. Because the inquiry is fact-dependent, defendant is obligated to
marshal every "scrap of competent evidence" in suppoi t < * f 1 he ti ial ca »ni t' s findings and
e

conclusion before he may attack their validity. Chenv.Ste^^

* " '-"V

t

P.3d 1177. This requires defendant to "play the devil's advocate" and "temporarily remove
i j'iojuJiv.v> an-.! :u;iy embrace the [prosecutor's] position." Id. at ^} 78 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

:

:

M

* "tU

^ -.

- ;^ - .

.-, >i

favorable to the trial .«uu; . . uul not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable
:

:IL

N n; case" «>r "merely restate or review evidence that points to an alternate finding

orafindinccont:. >

> :»•.••> .

.,;„,,..

;

,

anions omitted). Defendant

must "demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evMorve -!?.•! ; - n •

9

.-. \ y

those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Accord United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35,fflf25-27. In sum, to meet
the marshaling requirement, defendant must "ferret out the fatal flaw" in the evidence
accepted by the trial court. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., SIS P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah
App. 1991). Here, defendant has failed to do so and this Court should, therefore, refuse to
consider the merits of his claims. See United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, f 27.
For example, defendant asserts that the police faced no inherent danger in arresting
Gerrish and no specific threats from defendant. See Br.Aplt. at 7-11. To support these
claims, defendant states that the search warrant "did not allege that Raymon Gerrish was
trafficking in large amounts of illegal substances or that he was violent or dangerous."
Br.Aplt. at 5. Gerrish was simply wanted for felony drug possession. Id. Defendant further
states that Officer Wood did not suspect defendant of any crime or of being armed or
dangerous. Br.Aplt. at 6. These statements do not fairly reflect the record or adequately
marshal the facts.
When properly marshaled, the facts establish that Gerrish was not simply wanted for
drug possession.

He was wanted on a new felony drug possession offense and for

absconding from AP & P's supervision in connection with a prior conviction (R. 73). A
neutral magistrate determined that there was probable cause to believe that Gerrish was
actively concealing himself from the police and that there was reason to believe that other
individuals were helping him (id.). Aware of the dangers the police faced in trying to arrest
Gerrish, the police received judicial authorization to approach Cloward's property under

10

cover of darkness "for the safety of the officers" (id.). See Add. B (Affidavit). The fair
inferencefromil-e-. Ltci> \* :ii:!i«.Krri>h3 a wanted fugitive hiding from the police, was likely
to flee or fight if the police attempted to arrest him i u i< 11Ii.; it < ; •thei s < :»i the pi operty might aid
him.

These facts alone establish the inherent dangerousness the police faced in executing the

search warrant.
•'..'.'- :v But additional facts, again ignored by defendai it, establish tl latthedangei the officers
faced escalated once they entered Cloward's home.
Defendant fails to acknowledge that when the police loudly knocked on Cloward's
ilnor,, .n mounted iliLir presence several times, and demanded entry, no one responded.
Compare Statement of Facts, supra, with lir Aplf at c:> <> When ihe police finally entered,.
they found four people only feet from the door in the single-wide mobile home (R68: 6-7,
>.. - 5).

1 *- ) of the people, Gerrish and Sylvia, were actually "back-peddling" away

from the police ami fowanls a bedroom w ill) tline paraphernalia in plain \ lew (KoN: <>- /\ 1 NIy).

b> Ivia was hysterical, screaming, and not following police orders (JLU.;.

in the living room where drug paraphernalia was in plain view (R68:
was in

• - . • - V\ as

6-7, 15,19). Defendant

. Liwhi/n. --i^;. .^ • drugs were visiok •; RO<N . < T His, at best five police and AP

&P officers were faced with controlling four suspects, oic> fulion u :K h\ ^erka' •••'• hree
of whom were male, located in three different rooms in a single-wide mobile home, when it
was still possible Inai ouiers were hidden in the home or in the nearby RV trailer, and when
during the initial n iii n ite, it was unclear who was tl le fugit i v e ai id if an> accomplices were
present. See Statement of Facts, supra. Moreover, based on the fact that the no one inside

responded when the police loudly demanded entry, it was reasonable to suspect that the
occupants deliberately positioned themselves throughout the mobile home to better secure
weapons, destroy drugs, escape, or simply undermine police control of them. See Muehler
v. Menu, 544 U.S. 93,98-100 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-705 (1981)
(recognizing the dangerousness of executing search warrants in homes where multiple
persons are on the premises).
Defendant also does not fully recite Officer Wood's expressed concern that defendant
was armed and dangerous. See Br.Aplt. at 6. Wood testified that when he confronted
defendant, he did not know"what the situation was in the house" (R68: 27-28, 31). Under
cross-examination, Wood conceded that defendant followed his command to lay on the floor
and did not overtly threaten him, but also testified that he believed that defendant could still
threaten his safety even if handcuffed (id.). See United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200,
209-10 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the limited effectiveness of handcuffs in ensuring the
safety of officers); People v. Thurman, 209 Cal.App.3d 817, 823 (Cal. App. 1989)
(recognizing that even when a suspect's posture at a given moment is nonthreatening, this
"does not in any measure diminish the potential for sudden armed violence" created by the
surrounding circumstances). Most significantly, defendant fails to acknowledge—much less
marshal—the most salient fact testified to by Officer Wood and accepted by the trial court:
That at the time of the frisk, the police had not eliminated defendant as the fugitive or an
accomplice (id.). See Add. A (Trial Court Findings at R. 27). This fact alone fully supports
a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. See footnotes 3 &4, supra
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Finally, defendant is correct that the mere presence of drugs and/or drug paraphernalia
in a hc-Mc uoes not necessarily raise a suspicion thai ,he occupants are armed or dangerous.
SeeBr.Aplt. at 6-7. But!>. -\ - • facts are i lot so limited 1 1 le dn lgs and paraphernalia in tl lis
case were in plain view "all over the house/'with the exception of the kitchen (R68: 7, 15,
11 p

:

* :"

:

*. See Add. C. Anyone, in the mobile home would have been aware of this open use
l

oreover, \ v hen the police entei ed, Get i ish w as i lot hiding as he had earlier when

the confidential informant was on the property; instead, he was free! A ill .:•-.: in defend**'. *
presence. Coupled with the allegation that persons on the property were lookouts, these facts
:; i iheir reasonable inferences support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was not a mere
casual visitor, but w as in concei t w ith Gei rish and the othei s in tl leir crin linal endeav oi s,
In sum, this Court should refuse to consider the merits of defendant's challenge to the
validity of the frisk because he has failed to properly marshal the facts.
^2j Alternatively, Rcttsonuhlc Suspicion Supports ;:•..-. uejendant Was Armed
and Dangerous.
In executing a search warrant, the police may lawfully detain, handcuff, and question
those found on the premises. See Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98-100; Summers, 452 U.S. at 702705 (h I co"! nbination, 1 lolding tl lat the police i i my secure premises to be searched by
detaining, handcuffing, and questioning those on the premises at the time o \ he s-;; -..' r«

f

n

appeal, defendant does not challenge his detention or questioning.
^..KI,

dci../^^m argues only that he could not be frisked. See Br.Aplt. at 7-11.

Defendant's attack ib three-fold

I le claii ns that: (1) i n i t st.ii lg a vv anted fugiti\ e inside a

home is not inherently dangerous; (2) no facts support that he was armed or dangerous; and

(3) even if reasonable suspicion exists, any dangerousness was negated once he was
handcuffed. See id. Defendant's claims are without merit based on the facts of this case.
It is well-accepted that a police officer may frisk (pat down the outer clothing) an
individual that the officer is "investigating at close range" and suspects is armed and
dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (as applied to persons being investigated
on the street). See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (as applied to persons in
places being searched).6
The suspicion, of course, must be reasonable, meaning that it must be "supported by
'specific and articulable facts and rational inferences'" and not amount to a mere "'inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.'" State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 10, 112 P.3d
507 (quoting respectively United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990),
and Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). At the same time, it "'need not rule out the possibility of
innocent conduct.'" Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 10 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 273 (2002)). Moreover, the decision to frisk should not be judged in hindsight, but
evaluated in light of the facts "available to the officer at the moment" of the frisk. Terry, 392
U.S. at 21-22.
The test is objective. Id. "An action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment,
regardless of the individual [officer's] state of mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed

6

In Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93-94, the Court recognized that persons on searched
premises may be frisked if reasonable suspicion supports that they are armed and
dangerous or otherwise connected to the illegal activity being investigated. The Court
held, however, that it was unlawful to frisk the patrons in the public bar where there was
no basis to connect them to the illegal activities of the bartender. Id.
14

objectively justify the action.'

. The officers' subjective motivation is irrelevant."

Brigham C ity i >. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1.943, 1948 (2006). AccordMarkland, 2005 UT26,f 11
(citing State v II iinivif, Yinl! '! W. "H I I ^ P M) V)II \ II ,nr,

M

lt\ i * onseqiu nll> lli-1

issue is not one of emotion ( whether a specific officer "feared" the suspect), but one of
reason (whether a "man of reasonable caution" would have a basis to suspect that the suspect
was ai: =,» .; \ i dangerou -. Are HL Reasonable suspicion does not demand that an officer
wait for an "overt act ol hob ui i- " Sefoiv fnsk;ne a -i^m

•:•).'.:

-n ••

823. Rather, the purpose of a Terry frisk is to disarm suspects before an actual threat of harm
occurs, Cf. Brigham City, 126 S. Ct. at 1949 (recognizing in a different context that the
reasonableness re-': i" ^ \ • -1 of tl le Foi u tl i Amendment does not require an < > 11 leer to wait for;
a blow to be struck: "The role of a peace officer includes preventing \ i« K nv e nn. 1 storing
order").
As previously discussed, the facts, when properly marshaled, fully support the
dangerousness of the siti lation the officers faced in mlmnu I he hume In tim! (nu| arrest
Gerrish. See Subsection (1), supra. Nevertheless, defendant argues that the court improperly
relied solely on the inherent dangerousness of the situation and did not properly require an
individi lal suspicioi I of defendant's dangerousness. See Bi A} •//'. at' ] 11

' I Tie trial court,

however, did not rely solely on the inherent dangerousness of the situation i.
Instead, the court upheld the frisk because "[a]t the time defendant was detained [and

frisked], it was not known whether he was the subject of the first search warrant" (R. 27).7
See Add, A.
Defendant does not acknowledge the court's finding that defendant was still a suspect
at the time of the frisk . See Subsection (1), supra. Consequently, he establishes no fatal
error in the finding.
Instead, citing State v. Warren, 37 P.3d 270 (Utah App. 2001) [ Warren / ] , defendant
argues that Officer Wood must be subjectively afraid for reasonable suspicion to exist. See
Br.Aplt. at 9. But Warren /'s reliance on subjective analysis was rejected in Warren II.
Warren //held that an objective standard governs the assessment of reasonable suspicion,
although an officer's evaluation of the situation, based on his training and experience, may
support the objective reasonableness of the frisk:
The totality of the circumstances analysis objectively evaluates all facts before
the officer at the officer made the decision [to frisk]. The officer, with
experience and training, is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances
and determine the reasonableness of a Terry frisk. We recognized that some

7

Some courts have recognized that individuals present during a search of home
may be frisked based on no more than the inherent dangerousness of the situation. See
Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 606-07 (2d Cir. 1991); Dashiell v. State, 821 A.2d
372, 380-86 (Md. App. 2003) (both upholding protective frisks of persons present during
a search for drugs and evidence of drug sales). See also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 4.9(d) at 710-19 (2004) (discussing judicial split over whether particularized
reasonable suspicion is always necessary for a frisk conducted during a lawful search of
premises). That issue need not be decided here, however, because neither the trial court
below nor the State on appeal relies solely on the inherent dangerousness of the search to
justify the frisk. Instead, the trial court found and the State asserts that it was reasonable
to suspect that a fugitive, who is actively hiding with the assistance of lookouts, is armed
and dangerous. Under the circumstances here, it was also reasonable to suspect that
defendant was the fugitive or an accomplice. See Statement of Facts, supra.
Consequently, it was reasonable to suspect that defendant was armed and dangerous.
16

officers may never admit that they feared for their safety. . .. Likewise, other
officers may always claim they believed a stop was dangerous in order to
justify a frisk. Nevertheless, an officer's own evaluation of the circumstances
may provide valuable insight to factor into the objective analysis. How much
weight this factor is given is a determination for the individual court, though
a Terry frisk cannot be validated or invalidated based solely on a subjective
belief because no one factor alone is determinative of reasonableness.
See Warren II, 2003 UT 36, f 21. The United States and Utah Supreme Courts have since
reaffirr!0<r!Kf i.

M,-^ S ^: M.,:MU

.;;• veins icasonablesuspicion.8 ^^^r/^/raw C//V, I J6

S. Ct. at 1948; Markland, 2005 UT 26, % 11.
Defendant's reliance on State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, 68 P.3d 1052, is also
misplaced. In Valdez, this Court held that the police could lawfully detain but not question
Valdez, w here he \ < ' as asleep in

,:

arrestee'

.

•

: JMOKX

..:-- .u rested, but

Valdez was not otherwise suspected of a crime and did not present a threat to the officers.
Id. atfflf2-4 & 20-21.

Here, entirely different facts exist. At the time of the frisk, the

search for itic fugitive was not complete, defendant was still under suspicion, and the scene
was not secure. Therefore, the dm ILICRMM v ^..» '•

N

ji.'i • :•:

;,sipuUM

>, e

Statement of Facts, supra. Moreover, Valdez's holding that a lawfully detained suspect may
not be questioned while detained is of doubtful validity in light of the United States Supreme

8

Additionally, though ultimately irrelevant, defendant's assertion that Officer
Wood did not fear defendant is factually incorrect. Officer Wood did not discuss his
subjective emotions. He simply agreed that defendant complied with his orders and did
not overtly threaten him (R68: 30-31). At the same time, he testified that he did not know
what "the situation was inside the house" and did not know what role defendant or the
others played in the search (R68: 27-31).

Court's subsequent holding that such questioning is constitutionally permissible. See
Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98-100.
Finally, defendant claims—without supporting authority—that the fact that he was
handcuffed diminished any reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous. See Br.Aplt at 11.
But as Officer Wood testified, handcuffing did not negate the possibility that defendant was
still dangerous (R68: 27-28). Indeed, it is widely-recognized that the effectiveness of
handcuffs is limited:
Handcuffs are a temporary restraining device; they limit but do not eliminate
a person's ability to perform various acts. They obviously do not impair a
person's ability to use his legs and feet, whether to walk, run, or kick.
Handcuffs do limit a person's ability to use his hands and arms, but the degree
of the effectiveness of handcuffs in this role depends on a variety of factors,
including the handcuffed person's size, strength, bone and joint structure,
flexibility, and tolerance to pain. Albeit difficult, it is by no means impossible
for a handcuffed person to obtain and use a weapon concealed on his person
or within lunge reach, and in so doing to cause injury to his intended victim,
to a bystander, or even to himself. Finally, like any mechanical device,
handcuffs can and do fail on occasion.
United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 209 (5th Cir. 1993).
In sum, when the totality of the facts are considered in the light most favorable to the
trial court's ruling, they establish reasonable suspicion to support the search. See State v.
Peterson, 2005 UT 17, ffif 3 & 6, 110 P.3d 699 (distinguishing between a permissible
protective pat-down of a person on the searched premises, and an impermissible subsequent
search of the suspect's coat brought to him by the police); State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380,
1382-83 (Utah 1986) (distinguishing between a permissible protective pat-down of persons
present during a search and a subsequent full body search requiring probable cause).

18

POINT II
DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION THAT DRUG PARAPHERNALIA WAS
IN HIS POCKET SUPPORTS HIS ARREST FOR POSSESSION OF
PARAPHERNALIA
After Officer Wood felt a hard object in defendant's pocket during the weapons frisk,
he asked defendant what it was. Defendant volunteered that it was drug paraphernalia. The
officer then reached in and removed a hypodermic needle and metal spoon containing
methamphetamine residue. See Statement of Facts, supra.
Below, the trial court addressed whether the hard object in defendant's pocket could
be seized (R. 28). In doing so, the court assumed the frisk was legal and seemed to focus on
whether the seizure would be justified even if the object did not appear to be a weapon or
contraband (id.). See Add. A. See also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)
(addressing limits of plain touch doctrine). On appeal, defendant does not challenge this
ruling.
Instead, he argues only that if the frisk is determined to be illegal, any evidence
derived from the frisk must also be suppressed. See Br.Aplt. at 11-12. Here the derivative
evidence is defendant's admission that he possessed paraphernalia and the paraphernalia
itself.
The State agrees that if the frisk was illegal, any evidence derived from the frisk must
be suppressed.

But as argued in Subsection (2), supra, no illegality occurred here.

Consequently, the fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine is inapplicable. Instead, as the trial
court found, defendant's admission that he possessed paraphernalia established probable

19

cause for his arrest (R. 28). The seizure of the paraphernalia occurred incident to that arrest.
See State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, U 11, 69 P-3d 293.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm the
denial of defendant's motion to suppress and, as a result, his convictions.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18,
f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 654 P.2d 740, 743 (Cal. 1982). In
this case, the decisional process would be significantly aided by oral argument. See Utah R.
App. P. 29(a)(3).
Respectfully submitted this /7%^lay of January, 2007.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the foregoing brief of
Plaintiff/Appellee were delivered by [ ] hand [ ^mail to SAMUEL S. BAILEY, 220 East
200 South, Price, Utah 84501, this /Ittday

of January, 2007.

Christine F. Soltis
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

Addendum A

FILED
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

1 JAN 3 1 2006 j

(SteiMClCQiiSl
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
RAYMOND MARQUEZ,
Defendant

Criminal No. 051700158

Defendant moved to suppress certain evidence in this matter on September 29, 2005.
Memoranda of Points and Authorities have been submitted by defense counsel and by the County
Attorney, and a suppression hearing was conducted November 16, 2005. The Court, having
reviewed the hearing, and the memoranda, now finds as follows:
Law enforcement entered a home pursuant to a search warrant on January 29, 2005. No
evidence has been provided to indicate that the search warrant was invalid, and the Court finds
it to be a valid search warrant.
Immediately upon entry into the home, officers saw drug paraphernalia in plain view from
a position where the officer had the right to be. They secured the residence for officers' safety and
to preserve evidence and immediately sent officers to get another search warrant. Defendant and
others were lawfully detained, patted down and cuffed while the first search warrant was being
executed and the second search warrant was being sought. At the time defendant was detained,
it was not known whether he was the subject of the first search warrant.
When defendant was patted down for officer safety, officer felt a bulge in his pocket. The
officer was justified in patting down the defendant, and also justified in inquiring as to what the

bulge in the pocket was. Defendant volunteered that it was paraphernalia. The officers then had
probable cause to remove the contents of the pocket for officer safety and to preserve evidence.
The pocket yielded a needle, which could be used as a weapon against the officer, particularly if
it was infected with a communicable disease.
Even if the officer safety did not justify the search of the pocket, defendant's statement that
the pocket contained illegal contraband provided the officer with probable cause to perform the
search and to continue detainment and arrest. Upon arrest the contraband would have been
inevitably discovered either by a search incident to arrest, or a later inventory search. It is
therefore clear that the officer had probable cause to search defendant's pocket.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

That the defendant's

suppression motion is denied and the contents of the defendant's pocket are admissible at trial.
Dated this 30th day of January, 2006
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Addendum B

Addendum B

(
•HELPER MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT
•CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH I
'SEARCH WARRANT

C

Firm

i

f
^==H
I FEB - 2 2003I

FILED.SEP " 7 /00b I

• TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH:
•

•

'SEJJHMWISI

Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by: S. TRE1
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that:
On the premise(s) of:
70 west 9th North, Helper, Utah, House is a single wide mobile home, two bedroom, front
room, kitchen, and one bathroom. Home has one enclosed porch which is attached to the
single wide mobile home on the north west corner of the home, with one detached shed
located on the north side of the home. The single wide mobile home is gray in color with
thefrontdoor facing to the West. One dirt driveway on the west side of the home with
entrancefromthe south side of the home which is accessedfrom900 North. A check of
utilities with Helper City shows the utilities in the name of Shawn Cloward as of
01/29/2005.,

•

In the vehicle(s) parked at the above residence described as:
1991 Toyota Tercel: White, UTAH 221MWU, VIN# JT2EL43B7M0016504, 2 door
passenger vehicle,
1 late model Motor Home with cab over, yellow in color with two brown stripes parked on
the south side of main residence (70 West 9th North).

•

In the City of HELPER, County of CARBON, State of UTAH, there is now being possessed or
concealed certain property (Wanted Person) or evidence described as:
Subject Raymon Robert Gerrish, DOB 09/25/1982, SS# 528396642, 519M, 151 lbs, Hazel eyes,
Brown hair, Utah Driver's License Number 168871424
Which property (Wanted Person) or evidence:
Raymon Robert Gerrish, DOB 09/25/1982, SS# 528396642, 5'9", 151 lbs, Hazel eyes, Brown
hair, Utah Driver's License Number 168871424: Wanted for Third Degree Felony
Possession/Use of Controlled Substance - State of Utah, Department of Corrections, Adult
Probation and Parole - Fugitive.

MANDED

To make a search of the above named or described person(s), premise(s) and vehicle(s) for the herein
above described person, property or evidence, and if you find the same, or any part thereof, to bring it
forthwith before me at the, County of CARBON, State of UTAH, or retain such property in your
custody subject to the order of this court.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME

^f

This

day of

^^^J^'XAA.^I

IN THE HELPER MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT,
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SERVED:
Date:

<9|/ffi loS

Time:

By: £ .

.{fjjf
/

/k&A

HELPER MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That the AFFIANT has reason to believe that:
That on the premise(s) known as:
70 west 9th North, Helper, Utah: House is a single wide mobile home, two bedroom, front room, kitchen, and
one bathroom. Home has one enclosed porch which is attached to the single wide mobile home on the north
west corner of the home, with one detached shed located on the north side of the home. The single wide
mobile home is gray in color with the front door facing to the West. One dirt driveway on the west side of
the home with entrance to the driveway from the south side of the home which is accessed from 900 North.
A check of utilities with Helper City shows the utilities in the name of Shawn Cloward as of 01/29/2005.
That in the vehicle(s) parked at the above residence described as:
1991, Toyota, Tercel, White, UTAH 221MWU, VIN# JT2EL43B7M0016504, 2 door passenger vehicle
1 late model Motor Home with cab over, yellow in color with two brown stripes
In the City of HELPER, County of CARBON, State of UTAH, there is now certain property (Wanted Person) or
evidence described as:
•

Subject Raymon Robert Gerrish, DOB 09/25/1982, SS# 528396642, 5'9", 151 lbs, Hazel eyes, Brown hair,
Utah Driver's License Number 168871424

•

The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are:

•

Your AFFIANT, Officer S. Trent Anderson is a Police Officer with the Helper City Police Department
and has been employed as a Police Officer for the past five years. Your AFFIANT is currently assigned
to the patrol division. Your AFFIANT graduated from the Utah Police Officer Standards and Training
Academy in January of 2000. Your AFFIANT has attended the following in-service training classes
which involves hundreds of hours: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Drug Interdiction, Stolen
Vehicle Apprehension, Sexual Assault Investigations, Instructor Development, Incident Response to
Terrorist Bombings, Hazardous Materials Awareness, and Introduction to basic drug intelligence and
analysis.

•

Subject Raymon Robert Gerrish, DOB 09/25/1982, SS# 528-39-6642,5'9", 151 lbs, Hazel eyes, Brown
hair, Utah Driver's License Number 168871424. On 01/29/05, CI contacted our agency and advised
that CI observed Raymon Gerrish several times on 01/29/05 attempting to conceal himself at 70 West
9th North in Helper, Utah and in the motor home. Utah Statewide warrants show an active warrant for
the arrest of Raymon Robert Gerrish in the amount of $5,000.00 issued by the 7th District Court in Price,
Utah, warrant # 981124276 - OTN 15665474. State of Utah, Department of Corrections also has
Search Warrant Affidavit - Page 1

Raymon R. Gerrish listed as a FUGITIVE with their agency.

Further grounds for issuance of a search warrant are attached hereto and incorporated herein.
Your AFFIANT has personally contacted the State of Utah, Department of Corrections, Adult
Probation and Parole - Agent Jeff Wood and confirmed that subject Raymon R. Gerrish is still
and active Fugitive with their agency. Your AFFIANT has also personally checked the State
of Utah, statewide warrants, and confirmed an active warrant for subject Raymon R. Gerrish.
Your AFFIANT has personal knowledge of this residence and personal knowledge that Shawn
Cloward is the owner of the residence. Your AFFIANT further personally checked the
residence and observed the description and vehicle's at the residence.
WHEREFORE, the AFEIANT ppays that the search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items at
any tinie4ay-^rni^^dW
reasons:
It is currently nightnm#ahd therms a need to serve the warrant before daylight for Officer Safety
r£as<^^
information relating to 70 West 9th North in Helper, Utah with
illegal drug activity. The warrant for Raymon R. Gerrish has been issued for Illegal Possession/Use
of Controlled Substance - Felony 3. Subject Raymon R. Gerrish is also listed by the State of Utah,
Department of Corrections as a FUGITIVE. It has been your AFFIANTS experience that persons
using and or distributing illegal controlled substances pose a higher threat of safety to Law
Enforcement therefore by allowing Law Enforcement night time entry into the home or vehicles aids
in greater degree of cover and the safety to all officers involved in order to effect a lawful and safe
arrest.
Your AFFIANT has received information that there are suspects acting as lookouts at this location
and for the safety of officers, a nighttime approach is needed. Presently, the two referenced vehicles
are parked at the above residence. The CI told AFFIANT that CI saw Gerrish at both the residence
and motor home on 01/29/2005. Officers making entry to the residence would be easily seen by the
occupants of this motor home.

• This affidavit was reviewed by ATTORNEY GENE STRATE of the CARBON COUNTY ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE.
*U&<^

AFFIANT, Officer S. Trent Anderson

Search Warrant Affidavit - Page 2

•

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

XxpCL^kzJ--^

IN THE HELPER KICNWl'KE JUSTICE COURT,
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Search Warrant Affidavit - Page 3

Addendum C

Addendum C

•HELPER MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT
•CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FILED
FEB - 2 2005

•SEARCH WARRANT

TO.KYPEACEOPmCER.NTHBSTATEC™

*> sfflliBfeh
»

«

!

!

Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by: S. TRENT AM)^SON7Tam *-*-«
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that:
On the premise(s) of:
70 west 9th North, Helper, Utah: House is a single wide mobile home, two bedroom,frontroom,
kitchen, and one bathroom. Home has one enclosed porch which is attached to the single wide
mobile home on the north west corner of the home, with one detached shed located on the north side
of the home. The single wide mobile home is gray in color with thefrontdoor facing to the West.
One dirt driveway on the west side of the home with entrance to the drivewayfromthe south side of
the home which is accessedfrom900 North. A check of utilities with Helper City shows the
utilities in the name of Shawn Cloward as of 01/29/2005.
In the vehicle(s) parked at the residence described as:
1972 Eldorado Motor Corporation, Model: Ecoline, Style: Motorized Home, White in color,
bearing UTAH 744MWV (which license plate is registered in the State of Utah to a different
vehicle), VIN# E34GHM00675, registered in the State of Utah to: Paul A. Pearson with a
registered address of 899 North 750 West #459 Price, Utah.
In the City of HELPER, County of CARBON, State of UTAH, there is now being possessed or
concealed certain property or evidence described as:
MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form.
• Materials used to package marijuana, specifically, plastic sandwich bags.
• Materials for using marijuana:
1.Cigarette papers, small sheets offlammablepaper with adhesive on one side,
2.Pipes, used to smoke marijuana,
3.Roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being smoked.
• Personal notes, records or narcotic transactions, listing names, dates, amounts sold.
METHAMPHETAMINE, a yellowish white powdery substance.
• Materials for packaging methamphetamine, specifically small plastic baggies.
• Materials for using methamphetamine, including hollow tubes for snorting

$

methamphetamine, small spoons for snorting methamphetamine, mirrors for holding
methamphetamine while being snorted, razor blades for cutting methamphetamine into
lines,
• Scales for weighing methamphetamine.
• Cut, substance used to dilute the methamphetamine.
SUSPECTED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE

•

Which property or evidence:
Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed.
Is evidence of illegal conduct.
COMMANDED

To make a search of the above named or described person(s), premise(s) and vehicle(s) for the herein
above described person, property or evidence, and if youfindthe same, or any part thereof, to bring it
forthwith before me at the, County of CARBON, State of UTAH, or retain such property in your
custody subject to the order of this court.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME

this

A±
fe^Z^
'««£«£«*

SERVED:
DATE:_

LL

Time:

Byt J / ' !A#\k jlAA/A

HELPER MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That the AFFIANT has reason to believe that:
That on the premise(s) known as:
70 west 9th North, Helper, Utah: House is a single wide mobile home, two bedroom, front room, kitchen, and
one bathroom. Home has one enclosed porch which is attached to the single wide mobile home on the north
west corner of the home, with one detached shed located on the north side of the home. The single wide
mobile home is gray in color with the front door facing to the West. One dirt driveway on the west side of
the home with entrance to the driveway from the south side of the home which is accessed from 900 North.
A check of utilities with Helper City shows the utilities in the name of Shawn Cloward as of 01/29/2005.
That in the vehicle(s) parked at the residence described as:
1972 Eldorado Motor Corporation, Model: Ecoline, Style: Motorized Home, White in color, bearing UTAH
744MWV (which license plate is registered in the State of Utah to a different vehicle), VIN#
E34GHM00675, registered in the State of Utah to: Paul A. Pearson with a registered address of 899 North
750 West #459 Price, Utah.
In the City of HELPER, County of CARBON, State of UTAH, there is now certain property or evidence described
as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form.
• Materials used to package marijuana, specifically, plastic sandwich bags.
• Materials for using marijuana:
1. Cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with adhesive on one side,
2. Pipes, used to smoke marijuana,
3. Roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being smoked.
• Personal notes, records or narcotic transactions, listing names, dates, amounts sold.

•
•
•

METHAMPHETAMINE, a yellowish white powdery substance.
• Materials for packaging methamphetamine, specifically small plastic baggies.
• Materials for using methamphetamine, including hollow tubes for snorting methamphetamine,
small spoons for snorting methamphetamine, mirrors for holding methamphetamine while being
snorted, razor blades for cutting methamphetamine into lines,
• Scales for weighing methamphetamine.
• Cut, substance used to dilute the methamphetamine.
SUSPECTED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE

•
•
•
•
•
•

That said property or evidence:
• Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed.
• Is evidence of illegal conduct.
Search Warrant Affidavit - Page 1

•

The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are:
Your AFFIANT, Officer S. Trent Anderson is a Police Officer with the Helper City Police Department and
has been employed as a Police Officer for the past five years. Your AFFIANT is currently assigned to the
patrol division. Your AFFIANT graduated from the Utah Police Officer Standards and Training Academy
in January of 2000. Your AFFIANT has attended the following in-service training classes which involves
hundreds of hours: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Drug Interdiction, Stolen Vehicle Apprehension,
Sexual Assault Investigations, Instructor Development, Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings, Hazardous
Materials Awareness, and Introduction to basic drug intelligence and analysis.
On 01/29/05 at approx. 2124 hours, The Helper City Police Department served a search warrant on 70 West
9th North in Helper, Utah for a wanted person. Officers from Helper City, Carbon County Sheriffs Office,
and Adult Probation and Parole assisted in the search warrant. Upon executing the search warrant, wanted
person (Raymon R. Gerrish) was located and placed under arrest for an active statewide warrant in the
amount of $5,000.00 in which he was also listed as a fugitive by Adult Probation and Parole. While
securing the residence, I observed in plain view (north bedroom) two suspected methamphetamine pipes and
observed on suspected marijuana bong (front room floor). Two hypodermic needles, two bags of small clear
plastic bags, and one spoon with suspected methamphetamine residue were located on suspect Raymon
Gerrish. One hypodermic needle and one spoon with suspected methamphetamine residue was located on
Raymond C. Marquez. Suspected drug paraphernalia and suspected methamphetamine residue was located
(plain view) in the residence upon executing the search warrant. In your AFFIANTS experience, illegal drug
parphernalia and-controlled substance can and have been stored in vehicles.

-j-, ~~
FIANT prays that the search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items^at any tjl
it due-to the following reasons:
^ ^

It is currently nighttime, and there is a need to serve the warrant before daylight to secure important
evidence in this case that may provide immediate information to further your AFFIANTS investigation
during the night. On 01/29/05 at approx. 2124 hrs., Helper City Police Department, along with the
Carbon County Sheriffs Office and Adult Probation and Parole executed a search warrant at 70 West
9th North for a wanted person. While executing the search warrant, suspected drug paraphernalia and
suspected methamphetamine residue was located in plain view in the north bedroom and front room
of the residence. Other suspected drug paraphernalia was also located on one Raymond Marquez and
one Raymon Gerrish. At this time, we wish to continue without delay in searching for additional
controlled substances and/or drug paraphernalia.

This affidavit was reviewed by ATTORNEY GENE STRATE of the CARBON COUNTY
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE.
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^hi y4^^/

^^c^^y-

AFFTANT^g Trent AntWcnn

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

IN THE HELPER MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT,
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
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